# The French Luxury Model: How Champagne, Couture, and Global Brands Turned Rarity into a Mass-Market Industry

France's luxury industry—Champaign, fashion, leather goods—contributes billions in exports and over 160,000 jobs, yet it faces a core paradox: how can luxury goods, traditionally defined by rarity and exclusivity, be mass-produced and sold to millions? This article explores how French luxury evolved from aristocratic splendour to a global, industrialised model led by financial groups like LVMH, Kering, and Hermès. The key insight is that luxury is not defined by intrinsic qualities like price or quality, but by social convention—goods become luxury when society deems them extraordinary. Through innovations like the Champagne industry's protected designation of origin (PDO) and the rise of Haute Couture, France created a "mass luxury" model that other nations have struggled to replicate.

# The French Luxury Model: How Champagne, Couture, and Global Brands Turned Rarity into a Mass-Market Industry

## Table of Contents

- Key Points
- Why This Research Matters
- Defining Luxury: Price, Quality, or Rarity?
- Luxury as a World of the Extraordinary
- Aristocratic Luxury and Elite Luxury
- Old Innovations: Reaching Beyond the Contradiction
- Champagne: The First Mass Luxury Product
- French Haute Couture: From Elite Craft to Global Brand
- New Innovations: The Rise of Financial Luxury Groups
- The Luxury Tree: Managing Heritage in Modern Luxury
- What This Means for Consumers
- Limitations of This Research
- Recommendations for Understanding Luxury
- Frequently Asked Questions
- Source Information

## Key Points

- Luxury is defined by social convention, not intrinsic qualities.
- Champagne was the first mass luxury product, using PDO to ensure quality.
- French luxury evolved from aristocratic splendour to elite luxury.
- Financial groups like LVMH and Kering industrialized luxury while preserving heritage.
- The 'luxury tree' strategy lets brands expand while managing exclusivity.

## Why This Research Matters

Luxury is the only field in which the French economy holds the pole position in export markets. The French luxury groups—**LVMH** (owned by the Arnault family), **Kering** (formerly PPR, owned by the Pinault family), **Hermès**, and **Chanel**—are among the international leading groups and enjoy a formidable global reputation. This is not a trivial matter, nor does it concern a marginal sector of the economy.

Before the COVID-19 crisis, the French wine and spirits industry exported more than **10 billion euros** each year. The fashion sector employed more than **160,000 people** in France and regularly exported more than **a third of its production**. Luxury is today essential to France's international competitiveness—one could ask what the French trade deficit or unemployment rate would be without this sector. Luxury is also a key industry because its profitability is incomparable.

## Defining Luxury: Price, Quality, or Rarity?

Many definitions of luxury rely on empirical nomenclatures—essentially lists of sectors—which leads to difficult problems of delimitation. For instance, what part of the fashion industry belongs to luxury when street fashion groups like Zara and H&M sell millions of cheap clothes? The author, Christian Barrère of the Laboratoire Regards at the University of Reims, argues that we need a theoretical definition of luxury, even if it creates practical challenges when applied to real-world data.

In the economics and management literature, there is no general agreement on the definition of luxury. Most authors use "naturalistic" definitions, defining luxury by the presence of a particular property or several properties. However, it is always possible to find cases in which those properties do not hold up.

**Can luxury be defined by cost?** A luxury good is not necessarily expensive. Today, in renowned French restaurants, **Chateldon water** is considered luxury water, but the price of a bottle rarely exceeds **ten euros**, which is not significant in itself. Should we look instead at relative price—the ratio of the price of the luxury variety to the price of ordinary varieties? This introduces the idea of a gap, a difference, between the ordinary price of mineral water and the "non-standard" price of luxury water. But the difference may be small—a few euros in this case—and sometimes Chateldon is even offered at the same price as Perrier or San Pellegrino. Where the gap exists, it must also be explained: why do consumers have a higher willingness to pay? This leads to a vicious circle: luxury is defined by price, and price is defined by luxury.

**Can luxury be defined by quality or extreme quality?** The quality of a Hermès scarf has often been debated—many women's magazines report that these scarves tend to lose their colours easily, especially in the rain. On the other hand, the quality of a **Facom wrench** is infinitely superior, perhaps even absolute, since the brand guarantees its tools for life; a damaged tool is immediately exchanged for a new one at any point of sale. Yet these tools are not included in any luxury goods classification.

**Can luxury be defined by rarity?** The case of diamonds is often cited in support of this idea, but the Champagne industry produces more than **300 million bottles each year**—and no one disputes champagne as a luxury drink.

All of this shows that naturalistic, essentialist definitions—those that link the luxury good to its intrinsic properties—fail. We can always find an ordinary good that meets the stated conditions (price, quality, or rarity), and a luxury good that does not. Historical study also shows that goods can be luxury in some societies or times and ordinary in others. **Yesterday, spices were luxury goods; today, the same spices are ordinary goods.** In the 19th century, wild sturgeons of the Gironde and Adour rivers were not considered noble fish that could be sold on the Bordeaux markets—particularly because they had many bones. Small boat owners used to give them to their employees as a supplement to their wages. The employees would split the fish, tear off the central edge, remove the smelly blackish pocket near the gills that contained the eggs, and feed that pocket to their pigs! Today, those eggs constitute **Aquitaine caviar**, sold at prices as high as Iranian caviar.

Rather than being defined by a luxurious nature, luxury goods are designated by the fact that their social and cultural status is, within a given context, related to luxury. As goods perceived and experienced as luxury, these cultural products are based on a **social convention**: high-value goods are what society deems them to be. This luxury status is related to some exceptional characteristic that allows these goods to stand out from basic goods. Luxury goods are, by definition, **extra-ordinary**, whereas other goods are ordinary, standard, basic, or utilitarian. Luxury implies a difference that is distinctive to goods relating to pleasure rather than necessity, and is defined in opposition to standard and ordinary goods.

## Luxury as a World of the Extraordinary

A second condition is needed to distinguish luxury goods from sophisticated or complex industrial goods—goods that are also extraordinary. A space capsule, for example, is an extremely complex and exceptional good; its quality is extremely high since its reliability must be very close to 100%. However, it is not a luxury good. The distinction, therefore, must separate goods and services related to necessity, utility, and needs (which can be common or exceptional, like the capsule) from goods and services related to pleasure, desire, hedonics, or aesthetics. For luxury goods, the gap is created *within* the realm of pleasure, not necessity.

The aristocratic way of life was founded on **splendour**: aristocrats gave feasts and balls, played music, went hunting, and entered tournaments. They lived an absolutely different life from the bourgeoisie and ordinary people. They consumed luxury goods—fine wines, large wild game, sophisticated food, rich clothes—and this consumption was woven into a dazzling lifestyle. The specificity of the aristocratic lifestyle was a transcription of the difference between social ranks, which were believed to correspond to a divine hierarchical order distinguishing groups of a different nature: "blue-blooded" aristocrats and "red-blooded" commoners; some at the top of the social scale, close to heaven and God; others at the bottom, close to earth and evil.

Aristocrats belonged to a **"society of being,"** while the bourgeoisie belonged to a **"society of having."** When the enriched bourgeoisie competed with the nobility throughout the 18th century—seeking to distinguish itself from the rest of the people and to integrate into the dominant elite—it could not access splendour, the domain of being, which presupposed a cultural capital it did not possess. The bourgeois had money and could buy expensive goods, but could not compete with the aristocracy in the register of being. Think of *Molière's Bourgeois Gentilhomme*, who tries to mimic the aristocrats but, lacking the requisite cultural capital, succeeds only in being ridiculous. The increasing economic power of the bourgeoisie allowed them to access luxury goods and, using the development of commoditisation, to substitute the **logic of having** for the **logic of being**. They replaced splendour with luxury—and in doing so, encouraged the expansion of the luxury sector.

## Aristocratic Luxury and Elite Luxury

In aristocratic society, a radical social segmentation between the elite and the people governed social functioning. In France, the *Ancien Régime* (Old Order) spoke of blue (aristocratic) and red (commoner) blood. Luxury was peculiar to aristocratic groups: ordinary people were not considered capable of appreciating luxury goods; to give them luxury goods would have been "as giving pearls to pigs." According to the framework of the **société de Cour** (court society) described by Elias in 1983, this distinction was strictly organised through norms and rules. At the same time, rivalry—both between courtesans and internationally between the Royal and Imperial Courts—tended to render luxury consumption ever more exuberant.

Because luxury goods were reserved for the aristocracy and the Courts, their markets were necessarily narrow. This explains why luxury goods were considered rare—yet this scarcity was mainly related to their *outlets*, not their intrinsic characteristics. It is always possible to produce more sophisticated goods—and even to find more diamonds—by hiring more people.

Later, in the **19th century**, the interpenetration between the bourgeoisie and the old aristocracy led to the constitution of a social elite separated from the common people by its wealth, power, and education. The old aristocracy and the high bourgeoisie flocked to new, ostentatious leisure venues described by Veblen in 1899: seaside holidays, horse races, concerts, art galleries, dancing. With the rise of the bourgeoisie in the 18th century and its triumph in the 19th, **aristocratic luxury became elite luxury**. Luxury became increasingly embodied in goods produced for the market, purchasable by anyone with sufficient purchasing power. The French Revolution decreed that every citizen could dress as they wished, without reference to social position. The middle bourgeoisie wanted to stand out from ordinary people and live more comfortably. All of this created new expansion opportunities for luxury markets.

Yet elitist luxury sets up a contradiction between luxury and mass production. The traditional model of distinction upon which traditional Western luxury was founded is in direct opposition to mass-produced luxury. Luxury refers to extra-ordinary goods produced by craft sectors using a sophisticated, highly-skilled workforce—far removed from industrial processes. According to the **Baumol effect**, craft production increases both the absolute and relative prices of luxury goods (as seen in Haute Couture prices), which tends to increasingly limit the size of their markets. The mass production of numerous identical goods tends to downgrade them to standard goods by introducing standardisation. Industrial production guarantees the identity, similarity, and permanence of goods to match consumer expectations—but mass production is thereby dedicated to standard goods with basic utility. In short, luxury and mass production are opposites in terms of both supply and demand conditions.

## Old Innovations: Reaching Beyond the Contradiction

During the 19th century, changes occurred in some luxury sectors. New technologies allowed industrial production to replace handcrafting, as in the perfume industry. New distribution channels appeared: the *grands magasins* (department stores) and chain stores brought fashion goods to every city. This evolution was clearly visible in France with the successive emergence of luxury suppliers—no longer individual artisans but **familial (capitalist) enterprises** oriented toward markets and motivated by profitability:

- Puiforcat (1820)
- Manufacture de Gien (1821)
- Mauboussin (1827)
- Christofle (1830)
- Bernardaud (1863)
- Ercuis (1873)
- Hermès (1837)
- Vuitton (1845)
- Hédiard (1854)
- Dupont (1872)

At this time, the development of luxury industries in English-speaking countries was constrained by **puritanism**, which resulted in the worldwide pre-eminence of French (and, secondarily, Italian) luxury. Two industries played a key role in the expansion of luxury markets and organisational change: the Champagne industry and French Haute Couture.

## Champagne: The First Mass Luxury Product

The Champagne wine industry is the first product of mass luxury. Its growth trajectory is remarkable:

- In **1832**, just **600,000 bottles** were sold.
- By **1844**, this had risen to **7 million bottles**.
- By **1870**, it reached **17.5 million bottles**, of which almost **14 million were sold abroad**.

The great *Maisons de Champagne* (Champagne houses) developed wine exports and innovated in wine marketing, often using the networks they had formed in the textiles trade. They mainly aimed at the German market and at the British market, which was likely to have strong and fast growth. In **1802**, Moët sold **6,826 bottles** in Great Britain; by **1810**, despite the Continental System, **54,980 bottles** were sold. This growth was supported by the creation of new suppliers: Besserat de Bellefon (1843), Boizel (1834), Bollinger (1829), Canard Duchêne (1868), Deutz (1838), Charles Heidsieck (1851), Krüg (1843), Charles Lafitte (1848), Pommery (1836), Mumm (1827), and others.

Nevertheless, during the 19th century, champagne production remained deeply heterogeneous. The main part of production was poor-quality wine for the mass markets of the Paris area: **90% of production consisted of red wines**, and in **1875**, the volume of sparkling champagne strictly speaking represented less than **2%** of the entire volume of wines made in Champagne (Colin, 1973). But the development of outlets in European courts turned external markets into the driving force of production growth and led to a new identification between sparkling champagne and as the wine of celebration, giving it a relative specificity. The dependence on exports—synonymous with high transportation costs—strengthened the incentive to choose a quality product with high unit value. In **1870**, only **25%** of champagne wines were consumed in France.

In the last quarter of the 19th century, economic depression, together with the **phylloxeric crisis** (the grapevine pest epidemic), and then around **1910** serious sub-production crises, led to transformed relations in the region. The poorest viticulture was incapable of resisting the crises or competing with growing production from the South of France. Many vineyards were deserted, and a selection of the best soils was made: from more than **56,000 hectares in 1862**, only **38,000 hectares** remained on the eve of the First World War.

For quality viticulture run by the great houses, the big crisis of the 1910s became the opportunity to ensure its hegemony and impose its strategy. The houses used the crisis—which put the previous development model into question—to exploit the specific advantages they had: capacity for innovation, ability to produce quality wine, and knowledge of foreign markets. For this purpose, they used the struggle for the **PDO (Protected Designation of Origin)** as a means to impose a quality policy on the entire sector and restructure it on new bases. The "protection" of the PDO—a legislation invented on this occasion in the Champagne region and afterwards extended to many wines and agricultural products—allowed the segmentation of the market into two strictly separated categories: ordinary sparkling wines and quality sparkling wines, namely champagnes. Starting from a comparative advantage of quality and fame, they accentuated it and turned it into a definitive advantage.

At the beginning of the 20th century, the restructuring of the sector around a quality policy was made possible by several changes:

-
**Growth of demand**, particularly international demand, allowed a clear specialisation in sparkling wine production (to the detriment of still wines). By **1910**, red wine had nearly disappeared, at least from the main vineyards of Reims and Epernay. Moreover, since differences in soil played a minor role, a general quality policy allowed a less scattered and higher average quality.
-
**Technical progress** in vine growing, but above all in winemaking, constituted a barrier to entry for wine growers aiming at final production. The necessity of assembling different wines to improve and stabilise quality, the recourse to chemistry, oenology, and expensive equipment, limited wine growers to a role as grape suppliers. While at the beginning of the 19th century wine growers often made the entire product, by the end of the century the Houses assembled wines and sold them, while wine growers produced grapes and sold them to wine merchants.
-
**Control of the export market** by the great wine merchants led to an internal restructuring that allowed them to implement advances in oenological technology and organise product differentiation according to local preferences in export markets.
-
**The perishability of grapes** (hardly transportable without spoiling), the protection of transport costs and taxes, and the possession of specific assets (storage places, expertise) consolidated the relationship between locally-grown grapes and wine.

Under these circumstances, the economic domination of the great *Maisons de Champagne* and their political control over the region succeeded in imposing the quality strategy on the entire sector via the PDO. They imposed it on fraudulent wine merchants (those who did not buy local grape or must) against their opportunistic strategy of producing from imported raw materials. They also imposed it on wine growers by playing on PDO requirements, making it compulsory to link the quality of the final product to the quality of the grape. So the practices of free riding were little by little eliminated. To obtain the benefit of the PDO, wines had to obey a certification process founded on qualitative criteria. The PDO system eliminated low-quality strategies, imposed high quality, and established Champagne wine as a **luxury good**.

With Champagne, the gap between standard and luxury goods was based on extra quality—but also on the wine's iconic status as the wine of feasts and ceremonies. Extra quality could be reproduced even where production became mass production: Champagne wine is an "industrial" wine, produced by assembling different types of grapes growing across a territory that can be enlarged. The main problem inherent in democratising this luxury product was maintaining the image of a luxury wine while expanding the quantities sold.

This was achieved through **concerted inter-professional regulation**: management of the supply/demand relationship for grapes through administrative determination of the grape price, extension of a common production discipline, standardisation of the correct vine-working methods, definition of quality norms, and permanent reinforcement of quality. In doing so, the great *Maisons de Champagne* invented a new type of product: the **democratic, mass-market luxury product**. In the **1950s**, **50 million bottles** were sold annually; from **2004**, this figure increased to more than **300 million bottles**, of which around **45% were exported**. This proved possible because the wine continued to seem an exceptional product, synonymous with special occasions, and very different from other wines, carrying strong semiotic characteristics.

## French Haute Couture: From Elite Craft to Global Brand

The second sector to create mass-oriented luxury was French **Haute Couture**. The sector traditionally produced highly sophisticated models based on very expensive fabrics and very long handcrafted manufacturing processes, for a tiny elite clientele. The article's discussion of Haute Couture sets the stage for the broader transformation of luxury—where the craftsmanship inherent in couture would eventually give way to industrial groups capable of scaling production while preserving the *image* of exclusivity.

## New Innovations: The Rise of Financial Luxury Groups

The luxury industry evolved significantly during the **1970s and 1980s**. Long-established small businesses once owned by their founder-creators were replaced by the financial and industrial groups—**LVMH, Kering, Richemont, Hermès, Chanel, Ralph Lauren, Calvin Klein, Prada**, and others—that are now the leading luxury brands. These groups expanded their outlets considerably, so that luxury goods are now often mass-produced. Formerly restricted to the happy few, luxury is now on offer to millions of consumers worldwide.

Moreover, luxury groups are expanding the scope of luxury goods, and almost every industry is developing luxury segments—even those that mainly produce basic goods. **Jeans**, which used to be the archetypal ordinary, practical, cheap garment, now come in luxury versions: Prada, Dior, Balmain, and Dolce and Gabbana propose a broad range of jeans priced between **$500 and $1,000**, and Damien Hirst has designed jeans for Levi Strauss that are a snip at just **$27,000**! Apple has succeeded in creating computers and mobiles that are seen as luxury goods.

This new institution—the **financial and industrial luxury group**—became the leader of the new global and modern luxury sector, worldwide. The innovations of the seventies and eighties allowed financial groups to create this structure by acquiring established heritage brands and scaling them across global markets.

## The Luxury Tree: Managing Heritage in Modern Luxury

The author characterises the new supply model as being based on **management of the heritages they create**, represented as a **"luxury tree"**. In this model, each luxury brand is cultivated like a tree: its roots lie in its heritage and artisanal tradition; its trunk is the core brand identity; and its branches extend into new product categories, new markets, and new consumer segments. This demanding strategy requires:

- Preserving the authenticity and story of the original craft house
- Developing **accompaniment strategies**—guiding consumers from their first accessible purchase toward higher-end products
- Managing scarcity signals while actually producing at scale
- Maintaining the luxury image while expanding outlet networks worldwide

The Champagne model provided the template: use a certification system (like the PDO) to guarantee quality, standardise production methods, and segment the market into ordinary and luxury categories. The financial luxury groups applied this logic to fashion, leather goods, perfumes, and watches—creating the global luxury economy we know today.

## What This Means for Consumers

For consumers, this research offers several practical insights into how luxury works in the modern economy:

-
**"Luxury" is a social label**, not an objective property. A $27,000 pair of designer jeans is not fundamentally different in function from a $50 pair—but society has agreed to treat it as extraordinary.
-
**Mass production does not destroy luxury** if the brand manages its image carefully. Champagne produces 300 million bottles a year and remains a luxury product because its quality standards and ceremonial associations are preserved.
-
**Price does not define luxury**. Some luxury goods (like Chateldon water) are inexpensive, while some expensive goods (like a space capsule) are not luxury. The distinction lies in the cultural and symbolic meaning.
-
**Scarcity is manufactured**. The rarity of luxury goods is often related to their outlets, not their intrinsic limits. Brands control distribution to maintain exclusivity while producing at scale.
-
**The "luxury tree" strategy benefits consumers** by creating entry-level products (perfumes, small leather goods) that allow broader access, while preserving the exclusive top of the range.

## Limitations of This Research

This article is a scholarly, theoretical analysis published in an economics journal, not an empirical study with patient-level or consumer-level data. As such, it has several limitations:

- The author acknowledges the difficulty of moving from theoretical definitions to empirical specifications—"we need a theoretical definition of luxury, even if it leads to problems when we have to use it for empirical specifications."
- The paper focuses primarily on the French case and does not deeply compare the Italian, American, or Asian luxury models, although it acknowledges Italian luxury as secondary to French.
- The article was written before the COVID-19 crisis, and the author notes pre-crisis figures (e.g., wine and spirits exports of 10 billion euros). The pandemic's effects on the luxury industry are not analysed.
- The text provided is a preparatory version of the article published in *Économie Appliquée*, and the discussion of Haute Couture is truncated in this source document, so a full account of that sector's transformation is not available here.
- The "luxury tree" concept is presented as the author's characterisation; it is not empirically tested with case-study data in the provided text.

## Recommendations for Understanding Luxury

For readers, journalists, policymakers, and consumers who want to make sense of the luxury market, the author's analysis suggests the following:

1.
**Look beyond price tags.** Ask what social and cultural meanings a product carries, and whether society has agreed to treat it as extraordinary.
1.
**Recognise the role of certification systems.** The PDO system that saved Champagne is now used for many wines and agricultural products—it is a powerful tool for protecting quality and market position.
1.
**Understand that luxury brands are cultural managers.** Their most important work is not manufacturing—it is preserving the story, heritage, and image that justify the premium.
1.
**Watch for the "democratisation" of luxury.** When a luxury good becomes mass-produced, the brand must work harder to segment its market and protect its high-end image—exactly as Champagne did.
1.
**Appreciate the French specificity.** France's historical path—from aristocratic splendour to bourgeois luxury to mass luxury—created a unique competitive advantage that remains difficult to replicate elsewhere.

## Frequently Asked Questions

### What defines luxury according to this research?

Luxury is not defined by price, quality, or rarity, but by social convention. A good becomes luxury when society deems it extraordinary. It must belong to the realm of pleasure rather than necessity. This is why a space capsule, though extraordinary, is not luxury, while champagne is.

### Why can champagne be both mass-produced and luxurious?

Champagne produces over 300 million bottles a year and remains luxury. This is possible because its quality standards, protected by the PDO system, and its symbolic status as a celebration wine preserve its extraordinary image. The gap from ordinary wines is maintained through regulation, not scarcity.

### Is luxury simply about high price?

No. Price does not define luxury. Some luxury goods, like Chateldon water, are inexpensive, while expensive goods like a space capsule are not luxury. The distinction comes from cultural and symbolic meaning, not cost. Luxury is based on social convention and its connection to pleasure, not price.

### How did France create a mass luxury model?

France pioneered a model where luxury goods are mass-produced while keeping their exclusive image. This started with Champagne using the PDO certification to impose quality standards, and continued with Haute Couture. Later, financial groups like LVMH and Kering scaled heritage brands globally, applying the same logic.

### What is the 'luxury tree' strategy?

The 'luxury tree' describes how modern luxury groups manage brands. Roots are the brand's heritage and craft tradition, the trunk is its core identity, and branches are new product categories and markets. This strategy preserves authenticity while expanding sales, guiding consumers from entry-level products to higher-end ones.

### Does mass production destroy luxury?

Mass production does not necessarily destroy luxury if the brand carefully manages its image. Champagne produces 300 million bottles a year and remains luxury because its quality standards and ceremonial associations are preserved. Brands also manufacture scarcity by controlling distribution, keeping exclusivity even at scale.

### What should consumers understand about luxury goods?

Consumers should recognize that luxury is a social label, not an objective property. A $27,000 pair of jeans is not functionally different from a $50 pair. Price is not the defining factor; rather, society agrees to treat certain goods as extraordinary. Certification systems and brand image maintain that status.

### Should I get a second opinion on whether a luxury brand product is truly worth its high price?

A second opinion can help you understand that luxury status is a social label, not an objective measure of quality or price. Research shows that price, quality, and rarity do not define luxury; instead, society agrees to treat certain goods as extraordinary. For example, champagne is mass-produced yet remains luxury due to its protected quality standards and ceremonial image. A second opinion can clarify whether a product's cost reflects genuine craftsmanship or manufactured scarcity. Diagnostic Detectives Network provides independent expert second opinions.

## Source Information

**Original article title:** Christian Barrère. THE FRENCH LUXURY MODEL. Économie appliquée : archives de l’Institut de

**Author:** Christian Barrère, Laboratoire Regards, University of Reims

**Published in:** Économie appliquée: archives de l'Institut de science économique appliquée, 2021, vol. 1, pp. 51–80. DOI: 10.48611/isbn.978-2-406-11904-3.p.0051. (Text prepared as a preparatory version of the published article.)

**Archive reference:** HAL Id: halshs-03495849, submitted 20 December 2021.

This patient-friendly article is based on peer-reviewed research. The original work is an open-access scholarly document available through the HAL multi-disciplinary archive. This translated article aims to make the economic analysis accessible to a general audience while preserving all data, statistics, and conclusions from the original.


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